

The Ideology of the New Conservatism

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The aim of this paper is to analyse the ideological nature of David Cameron's Conservative Party and the Coalition Government. Cameron became Leader of the Conservatives in 2005, having seen off the challenge of his main rival and initial frontrunner, David Davis, and other candidates including Kenneth Clarke, who had stood unsuccessfully for the third time in a Conservative Party leadership contest.

Cameron's victory was a clear sign that the Party was willing to modernise. An aborted modernisation had been attempted under William Hague, Leader of the Conservative Party from 1997-2001. This was never a very serious attempt at modernisation and Hague was more comfortable campaigning on right-wing issues such as Europe and low taxation. Iain Duncan Smith was elected Leader in 2001 by the full membership (a constitutional innovation that never really worked), but never appeared to have a grip on his parliamentary party. He was removed in 2003 and replaced by Michael Howard. Howard was from the resolute right-wing of the Party and never attempted to modernise the Conservatives. He campaigned on right-wing, populist ideas such as taxation, immigration, crime and Europe in the 2005 General Election. Therefore, there was much for Cameron to do from 2005 onwards in order to make the Conservatives a successful electoral force once more.

The record of the Conservatives in these years has been subject to recent detailed discussion from writers such as Tim Bale and Peter Snowdon.¹ However, neither of these books focuses on the role of ideas to any significant extent and there is scope to analyse further the ideas of the Conservatives.

This is the first justification for this paper. The paper will go on to analyse the key themes and concepts associated with Cameron's Conservatives, starting with the idea of Civic Conservatism, associated with David Willetts, who became Minister for Universities in the Coalition. It will then go on to discuss the thought of Phillip Blond, namely the idea of 'Red Toryism'. The recent emphasis on social justice by leading Conservatives will also be discussed.

The second justification for this paper is that any new analysis of the ideological direction of the current Government in the UK must include a discussion of the Liberal Democrats. It will be argued that *The Orange Book* is important in this regard, and that there are striking similarities between the ideas listed above and those contained in this publication.

All of these ideas – civic Conservatism, Red Toryism, Conservative notions of social justice and 'Orange Book' liberalism are all sceptical of the central state. They share a preference for localism and a distrust of the role of active central government. Finally, it will be asked if this new form of Conservatism represents a return to 'One Nation' Conservatism.

Civic Conservatism

The idea of Civic Conservatism is associated with David Willetts.² Willetts has, arguably, made the most substantial contribution to the political thought of the Conservative Party since the downfall of Margaret Thatcher in 1990. His work seeks to provide a synthesis between free markets and community, arguing that there is no trade off between these two values.

Free markets

Willetts makes three arguments in favour of free markets. The first and most conventional is that markets are an expression of human nature. Humans have a desire to improve their conditions and this will involve concentrating on what they do best. Hence, economic progress was achieved by creating markets so that individuals could produce what they were best at and then exchange it with others in order to obtain what they most wanted. Hence, from very early history there were markets in operation. The idea of free markets is merely a development of this whereby individuals, corporations and nations could trade with one another. Ever more complex forms of production required concentrations of wealth for investment. Hence, markets are essential for the fulfilment of basic human emotions such as freedom and progress.

Secondly, Willetts rejects the idea that free markets are based on selfish human interests. Instead, markets are the most efficient means of producing wealth so that individuals can fulfil their motivations, which may or may not be based on narrow self-interest.

Finally, Willetts sought in *Modern Conservatism* to challenge the idea that markets are not efficient. There are several such arguments but the most popular one is that of Galbraith who argued that markets are not competitive since the reality is one of large firms that dominate in several sectors of the economy and are therefore able to dictate prices and promote consumer demand through extensive advertising campaigns.³ Hence, it was not true that sovereignty lay with the consumer. However Willetts, following similar arguments set out by several Conservative advocates of free markets such as Enoch Powell and Keith Joseph against Galbraith, argued that markets were competitive and were therefore efficient and allowed for human freedom and choice. In so doing Willetts drew on two strands of thought. The first was the 'Austrian school' who had argued that although perfect competition as defined by classical economists did not exist there was still 'imperfect competition' marked by the existence of competing firms. The Austrian school also showed how tacit knowledge was crucial in the operation of markets and was reflected in the price mechanism. The other theory used by Willetts to defend free markets was that of public choice, with the argument that public services did not reflect the 'general will', but instead were based on the self-interest of bureaucrats. Therefore, the interests of the public were best served by the market, through which they could express their own preferences.

Communities

Turning to communities, Willetts draws on a number of arguments to formulate what he regards as a distinctively Conservative form of community. Firstly, he engages with the Rawlsian argument that individuals removed from existing communal relations can formulate ideas of liberty and social justice.⁴ The distributive effects of this ‘veil of ignorance’ are less important than the contractarian nature of the Rawlsian argument. Willetts rejects such liberal contractarian theories on the same basis as communitarian critics of Rawls⁵, namely that it does not make sense. What defines an individual is the way in which they are shaped by and respond to the communities in which they live. Hence, the starting point for a Conservative definition of community is not a social contract that ‘creates’ society, but rather an organic theory of society. From this, it becomes clear that emphasis should be placed less on rights than on duties. Such duties “do not come from contracts which are voluntarily entered into but are inescapable parts of our life history as members of a community.”⁶

Willetts further defines the Conservative idea of community by drawing Oakeshott’s distinction between a ‘civic society’ and an ‘enterprise association’.⁷ The latter is one in which the government has clear ideological objectives and seeks to impose uniform patterns of behaviour on society in order to meet its objectives. The former is one in which the roles of the state are to defend its citizens from attack both internally and externally while at the same time allowing them to pursue their own objectives. This is an interesting discussion in the context of Willetts’ defence of Thatcherism as being in keeping with the conservative political tradition since some commentators have sought to defend Thatcherism in Oakeshottian terms, whereas others have seen it as an attempt to create a new kind of enterprise association in Britain.⁸ For Willetts, the most appropriate notion of community for Conservative politics is that of a civic society. This is crucial in relation to Willetts’ response to John Gray’s assertion that Conservatism is dead and also in his critique of New Labour as being over-reliant on the state to achieve its objectives.⁹

Markets and Communities: Providing a Synthesis

Willetts argues that “modern Conservatism aims to reconcile free markets (which deliver freedom and prosperity) with a recognition of the importance of community (which sustains our values).”¹⁰ The reconciliation is possible despite the claims of pessimists regarding the cultural contradictions of capitalism. Some commentators have argued that free-market capitalism replaces communal sentiment and respect for traditional social morality with greed and selfishness since these are the principles on which markets operate.¹¹ The more successful capitalism becomes the more likely it is that it will collapse as traditions are eroded. The likely outcome of this process will be an extension of government activity seeking to defend economic interests against increased social antagonism. However, Willetts makes several arguments as to why markets are not only compatible with community, but also are mutually reinforcing ideals, stating that, “there are deep and intricate links between markets and culture which Conservatives need to understand, treasure and celebrate.”¹²

The first such argument is that the institutions of the market are reliant on established social networks of trust.¹³ They can be and are enforced by regulation, but in most

instances market transactions are based on trust. Regulation and planning therefore undermine social relations and replace them with state direction. Markets are much more likely to facilitate trust since they occurred spontaneously as a means of allowing for exchange and because they require an ongoing negotiation between buyers and sellers. Here Willetts draws on the ideas of game theory, which stresses that human beings will be able to form trusting and co-operative relationships where there is a regular need to barter and compromise.¹⁴ Hence, the market is the most effective means of allowing human beings to move from positions of self-interest to broader community interests.

Secondly, tradition and community are important in conditioning the motives of consumers. The market, through the price mechanism, allows consumers to express their own preferences in a way that planning cannot. However, these preferences are themselves shaped by the wider social contexts in which people live. Hence, the market will allow for the expression of individual choices from within the wider context of collected wisdom. Moreover, these established social traditions stress the boundaries to the market: “there are some things you can’t sell and shouldn’t be allowed to. Any market economy, in order to survive, needs to operate within a social framework that supports and sustains it.”¹⁵

Thirdly, Willetts allows for the potential of economic changes brought about by market forces to create new forms of community. There are essentially two strands of communitarian thought in Conservative writing.¹⁶ The first is *elegiac*, placing stress on the sense of a lost ideal of community or ‘golden age’ represented, for instance, in recent Conservative thought by Roger Scruton.¹⁷ The second form of communitarian thought is the one expressed by Willetts and stresses the creation of new forms of community in response to economic change; for instance, the new working class communities formed as a response to the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation. These communities establish their own traditions and institutions. In a similar way Willetts argues that the results of the pursuit of free-market policies in the 1980s and 1990s will be the creation of new forms of community. It is for this reason that Willetts rejected Gray’s assertion that Conservatism is dead but at the same time also rejected the fatalism usually associated with conservative theories.¹⁸

Hence, for these three reasons, communities and markets are the twin pillars of Conservative politics and “Conservatism is at its finest and its most distinctive precisely when it integrates a commitment to the free market into the core values and institutions which hold our country together.”¹⁹

Red Toryism

Although much less sophisticated than the Civic Conservatism of David Willetts, Phillip Blond’s idea of Red Toryism received significant attention when first articulated. Blond’s contribution to Conservative thought mainly takes the form of newspaper and magazine articles, notably his *Prospect* article ‘Rise of the Red Tories’ published in February 2009, but his book *Red Tory*, published earlier this year was an attempt to set out his ideas in more depth.²⁰ Like Willetts, he emphasises the merits of civil society over the state but is more prepared to admit the tensions that exist between free markets and civil society.

Blond argues that civil society should be seen as an alternative to both the market and the state and that the radicalism of Cameron's new Conservatism is that it recognises the importance of the institutions of civil society.

Although Blond claimed that his ideas were new, he was also keen to stress the connections with the Conservative political tradition. He made the obligatory reference to Edmund Burke, arguing that what he wanted to do was to recreate the 'little platoons' that Burke had spoken of as the defence of a free people.

Blond also drew a similar portrait of liberalism as Michael Oakeshott, arguing that although it claimed to wish to set the people free it was in fact a rationalist, and therefore authoritarian, doctrine. Despite the obvious differences between the two rival paradigms in post Second World War political economy – Keynesianism and economic liberalism – both were essentially liberal doctrines and both had undermined civil society. Keynesianism led to the growth of the central state at the expense of civil society and neo-liberalism had led to the growth of the market, but this had also been at the expense of civil society. Social democracy and Thatcherism were therefore both antagonistic towards civil society.

Moreover, only a civil society emphasis within Conservatism can resolve class conflict. Keynesianism had led to an empowered trade union movement which stressed working class interests, but this had led to the ungovernability of the 1970s. However, the attempt to reduce the powers of the trade unions after 1979 had succeeded in the triumph of the middle classes.²¹

Disraeli, so Blond argued, had rightly understood the threats to the nation by the persistence of class conflict and had tried to pursue a Civic Conservative route out of this problem. However, the twentieth century had been dogged by class conflict. The significance of Cameron's reforms would be that he would finally be able to replace this class conflict with an emphasis on civic values capable of creating social unity.

One final problem identified by Blond was the persistence of monopolies, which had been the result of Keynesianism and economic liberalism. Keynesianism created nationalised monopolies, whereas neo-liberalism resulted in giant private corporations despite attempts by the latter to create a free-market economy. Monopolies were also destructive of the institutions of civil society.

Hence, Blond goes on to say that: "whether by private or public means, the mark of recent decades has been defined by this three-part story: the liberal consensus, the persistence of class, and the triumph of monopoly and speculation in the name of free trade and modernisation. Against this, Cameron's nascent civic conservatism would be the first radical break with all of the aforementioned ills."²²

Blond advocates a set of policies that he believes will not only restore the health of civil society but also help the economy to grow. He believes that there should be more cooperatives²³, worker buy-outs of local companies, much more rigorous anti-monopolies legislation and local investment banks. Interestingly, Blond's analysis includes a concern to make corporate power more accountable to local communities, including supermarkets which he sights as something that has particularly undermined

local communities. However, the localism preferred by Cameron says very little about the negative effects of the private sector on communities.

Social Justice

One of the most interesting developments within Conservative thought in recent years has been the attempt to capture the idea of social justice from the left in British politics. Social justice has historically been a concept associated with the Labour Party as socialists and social democrats sought to reform society along the lines of some preconceived notion of social justice. What the Labour Party meant by social justice was at times open to intense debate between the right and left of the Party and evolved over time. Loosely what it meant was that the market, left to its own devices, produced social injustice, in the sense that it over rewarded those at the top and overly penalised those at the bottom who were not responsible for their failure to compete in the marketplace. In this sense, social justice was bound up with ideas of distributive justice.

Conservatives tended to oppose the idea of social justice. This was true even of moderates within the Conservative Party who would defend redistribution more in terms of the need to maintain social harmony rather than abstract notions of social justice.²⁴ Free market Conservatives also opposed social justice as an unjustified intervention in the market. In this Conservative politicians drew on the ideas of Hayek, who argued that social justice was a mirage and Oakeshott who argued that it was a rationalist imposition on traditional forms of civil society.²⁵

More recently, in contrast, Conservatives have sought to grasp the idea of social justice away from those on the left. Some Conservative politicians and intellectuals like Willetts at one time rejected the idea of social justice but have come to accept it.²⁶

The key figure in the development of this strand of Conservative thought in recent years has been Iain Duncan Smith. Duncan Smith was an ineffective Leader of the Conservative Party between 2001 and 2003. However, one area where he has made a substantial contribution to recent Conservative ideology has been in the development of a distinctive approach to social policy. He was starting to do this tentatively before being forced out of the leadership and has founded the Centre for Social Justice.

In 2005 he was invited to lead the Social Justice Policy Group established by David Cameron.²⁷ This produced two reports. The first was entitled *Breakdown Britain* (2006) and identified five pathways into poverty: worklessness and economic dependency, family breakdown, addictions, educational failure and indebtedness. The second report, *Breakthrough Britain* (2007), proposed 190 policy recommendations including reforms to the tax and benefits system and to child care provision.²⁸

There are several points worth emphasising in these reports. The first is that the reports mark important changes to the way in which poverty and 'the poor' are understood in Conservative discourse from the era of the New Right: poverty is understood by its relative rather than its absolute conception. Moreover, poverty is seen as a multifaceted problem and policy solutions to it must involve making moral choices. For instance, participation in the labour market is seen as essential to an anti-

poverty strategy. However, emphasis is placed on reform of the benefits system rather than blaming the poor for being trapped in poverty. Again, this is seen as a major shift away from Thatcherism, where poverty was often seen as the result of the moral degeneracy of the poor, as a lack of individual effort – the ‘get on your bike and look for work message’ that came from the Conservatives in power after 1979.²⁹

The reports also demonstrate the main theme of this paper, namely that the state is viewed sceptically. Many of the solutions are seen as coming from local voluntary organisations rather than the central state. A large, complex, bureaucratic state is seen to be one of the reasons for the persistence of poverty – for instance the complexity of New Labour’s tax credits.

One final point that needs to be stressed here is that the proposals from the Centre for Social Justice do have implications for public expenditure. Many of the reforms to the tax and benefits systems are expensive in the short to medium term and it may well be that the agenda of the reformers like Duncan Smith will be abandoned as the Government seeks to force through cuts in public expenditure this autumn. This is a very clear example of where the aims of the central state conflict with the promotion autonomous institutions of civil society.

The significance of *The Orange Book*

At the time of its publication in 2004, *The Orange Book* had a significant impact.³⁰ It was regarded as a major new development in the political thought of the Liberal Democrats. On the whole, the book was written by a younger generation of Liberal Democrats, although it did include a chapter on economic policy by Vince Cable. The book has a preface by the then Leader, Charles Kennedy, which was rather lukewarm to say the least. The reason for this is that Kennedy represented the more established social liberal position within the Party.

Many social liberals regarded the book as an attempt to move the Liberal Democrats to the right. The response was a thoroughgoing critique of *The Orange Book* by a group of self-professed social liberals including Duncan Brack (former policy director to Paddy Ashdown), Richard Grayson (former policy director to Charles Kennedy) and a number of MPs including David Howarth, Chris Huhne and Steve Webb (although Huhne and Webb had both contributed to *The Orange Book*) with their book *Reinventing the State*.³¹

Realising that the original *Orange Book* publication had been divisive, the editors produced a second volume, *Britain after Blair* which sought to provide a more unified Liberal Democrat response.³² However, the subsequent publication of *Reinventing the State* exposed the ideological tensions that now existed at a senior level within the Liberal Democrats.

These ideological struggles were overshadowed by the recurring leadership crisis, including Kennedy’s forced resignation due to alcoholism and Ming Campbell’s decision to resign on the issue of his age.

However, what *The Orange Book* did was to help move the Liberal Democrats in a more rightwards direction. The leadership contest between Nick Clegg and Chris Huhne was seen as a right-left struggle for the future direction of the Liberal Democrats. Huhne had been a contributor to *The Orange Book* but was by this time seen as a defender of the social liberal tradition. Clegg was a ‘moderniser’, by which was meant someone who would lead the Party rightwards in the belief that a centre-right stance would be of electoral benefit since the Liberal Democrats were faced with more Conservative-Liberal Democrat marginal seats than they were Labour-Liberal Democrat ones.³³

So far the Liberal Democrat leadership has continued to back the Coalition strongly but there are doubters within the wider party, including at a senior level with Charles Kennedy, Ming Campbell and, possibly, Simon Hughes. The prospects of a schism are small since many of the Liberal Democrats are bound up in the Coalition at middle and junior ministerial levels. Equally defections may also be minimal since even some left-leaning Liberal Democrats are in seats where the Labour Party has only limited electoral appeal. At the grassroots level there are some who have left the Party and opinion polls continue to make gloomy reading for the Liberal Democrats, although if in time the cuts are felt to be beneficial to the economy voters may come back to the Party.

At an ideological level the significance of *The Orange Book* is that it shares the same scepticism to central government and a preference for localism and civil society as do the new Conservatives under Cameron, despite obvious differences between the two parties over electoral reform and Europe. Hence, *The Orange Book* marks another contribution to what I have argued in this paper is the ideology of the Coalition Government, a non-state, or even anti-state, form of collectivism.

Conclusions

There are two conclusions I wish to make in this paper. The first is that there is a recognisable core ideology held by contemporary Conservatives and, through *The Orange Book*, the Liberal Democrats, which is a non-state form of collectivism. Conservatives and ‘Orange Book’ Liberals reject the strong individualism of neo-liberalism and argue instead that ‘there is such a thing as society’. This was the title of one of the earliest modernising tracts and was itself an attempt to show that the Conservatives now rejected the famous, but probably misunderstood, statement of Margaret Thatcher that there was ‘no such thing as society’.³⁴

For Cameron’s Conservatives, civil society would be the central ideological principle, often expressed as ‘the big society’. A defence of civil society would distinguish the new Conservatives both from Thatcherism and from New Labour. Thatcherites had rejected all forms collectivism, rejecting any notion of social or distributive justice and embracing the free market. This policy regime was continued, if not radicalised, under John Major. In embracing ‘social justice’, albeit in a very different sense to what the left have understood that concept to mean and with the emphasis on the voluntary institutions of civil society there has been a clear shift in the underlying ideology of the Conservatives from individualism to collectivism.³⁵

However, the defence of civil society is also seen as being compatible with scepticism towards the central state. The failure of New Labour, according to the new Conservatives, has been its inability to see the limits of central state activity. The central state is a threat to civil society, just as is individualism. Hence, the Thatcherite hostility to the central state is maintained. For instance, Oliver Letwin, perhaps the most direct source of ideological influence on Cameron, has argued that “the state alone is not the answer. We see huge scope for non-state collective action, through social enterprises and community groups. Those on the left who claim that civil society can never be much more than a marginal top-up for state programmes simply reveal their own poverty of imagination.”³⁶

Does the mark a return to One Nation Conservatism? The answer to this question very much depends on what One Nation Conservatism is thought to be. Whereas the ideology of the New Right has been discussed frequently, the ideology of One Nation Conservatism has not. The second conclusion to this paper therefore requires some further elaboration.

One Nation Conservatism is often thought of as the progressive, socially liberal and welfare state oriented wing on the Conservative Party, associated with R. A. Butler, Harold Macmillan, Iain Macleod and Ian Gilmour among others. However, a recent study of the One Nation idea has questioned this understanding. David Seawright has argued that what the One Nation ideal constitutes is a political space within which the Conservative Party can debate policy and continually evolve in response to changing circumstances without becoming divided over ideology, unlike the Labour Party in the 1950s or the 1980s or the Liberal Party in its decline after 1910. As evidence of this understanding of One Nation Conservatism, Seawright shows how the One Nation Group, established in 1950, included people from different wings of the Party including centrists like Macleod and those who were much more sympathetic to the market like Enoch Powell and Angus Maude. The One Nation Group also included politicians with more Eurosceptic opinions. As people were promoted to the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet they had to leave the Group so that it remained a source of backbench opinion.³⁷

If one accepts this view of One Nation Conservatism then Cameron can be described as a One Nation Conservative. However, there are good reasons for maintaining the more conventional view of One Nation Conservatism since this is what the term means to most people when they use it. The argument that Euroscepticism and a belief in free markets are compatible with One Nation Conservatism seems counter-intuitive and there is good reason to think that it is. Most Conservatives who use the term One Nation mean a pragmatic, balanced approach to the state-civil society-market relationship.³⁸ Even those held to be supporters of the free market were much less so when they were most associated with the One Nation Group than they later came to be. Hence, Enoch Powell only really emerged as a champion of free markets after 1964. Even after he had resigned from the Treasury over the Cabinet’s refusal to support the spending cuts proposed by the Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft, in January 1958, he was to return as one of the most progressive health ministers in the early 1960s. Angus Maude was selected to be a member of the One Nation Group since he came from Political and Economic Planning, an influential think tank in postwar reconstruction. On this reading neither Powell or Maude was a straightforward economic liberal. Indeed, Maude was critical of the economic liberal thought of

Enoch Powell in his major work, *The Common Problem*, published in 1969.³⁹ The overwhelming majority of the membership of the One Nation Group was centrist and had strong links with the more overtly centrist Conservative Party organisations such as the Tory Reform Group.

From this perspective, the Conservative Party under Cameron is not a return to One Nation Conservatism. The emphasis on civil society is partly about ‘statecraft’ – the term first used by Jim Bulpitt to emphasise the pragmatic, vote-seeking behaviour of politicians and political parties.⁴⁰ The idea was useful in distancing the Conservative Party away from its Thatcherite past while at the same time showing a clear political divide between the Conservatives and New Labour. However, it was also ideological in the sense that it spelled out what the leadership of the modern Conservative Party believes – an anti-state form of collectivism. The institutions of civil society replace as far as possible the functions of the central state. This scepticism towards the central state is seen in the preference for public expenditure cuts over increases in taxation; the argument that the state crowds out the wealth-creating private sector; proposals for elected police commissioners; the creation of ‘free’ schools and so forth. In this sense, the new Conservative ideology is distinct from earlier One Nation ideas.

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- ¹ T. Bale, *The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010) and P. Snowden, *Back from the Brink* (London: HarperCollins, 2010)
- ² See in particular, D. Willetts, *Modern Conservatism* (London: Penguin, 1992) and D. Willetts, *Civic Conservatism* (London: Social Market Foundation, 1994). The following discussion is drawn from M. Garnett and K. Hickson, *Conservative Thinkers* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009)
- ³ For Galbraith see his *The New Industrial State* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967)
- ⁴ J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)
- ⁵ A good overview of the communitarian approach is M. Sandel (ed.) *Liberalism and Its Critics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984)
- ⁶ Willetts, *Modern Conservatism*, p.68
- ⁷ M. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975)
- ⁸ For instance N. O'Sullivan who argues that the New Right was such a rationalist project in his chapter 'Conservatism, the New Right and the Limited State' in J. Hayward and P. Norton (eds.) *The Political Science of British Politics* (Brighton: Harvester, 1986) and N. Barry, 'New Right' in K. Hickson (ed.) *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005) who defends the New Right in Oakeshottian terms.
- ⁹ J. Gray and D. Willetts, *Is Conservatism Dead?* (London: Profile and Social Market Foundation, 1997)
- ¹⁰ Willetts, *Modern Conservatism*, p.92
- ¹¹ Notably, J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London: Unwin, 1942) and D. Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (London: Basic, 1978)
- ¹² D. Willetts, 'The Free Market and Civic Conservatism' in K. Minogue (ed.) *Conservative Realism* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), pp.80-97; p.96
- ¹³ Willetts, *Modern Conservatism*, pp.96-99
- ¹⁴ Willetts draws here on the work of Robert Axelrod, especially his, *The Evolution of Co-operation* (London: Penguin, 1990).
- ¹⁵ D. Willetts, 'The New Contours of British Politics' in G. Streeter (ed.) *There is Such a Thing as Society* (London: Politicos, 2002), pp.52-59; p.57
- ¹⁶ Willetts, *Modern Conservatism*, pp.99-102
- ¹⁷ Especially in R. Scruton, *England: An Elegy* (London: Chatto and Windus, 2000)
- ¹⁸ See A. Gamble, *Politics and Fate* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000)
- ¹⁹ Willetts, *Civic Conservatism*, p.9
- ²⁰ P. Blond, 'Rise of the Red Tories' in *Prospect*, issue 155, 28th February 2009. See also P. Blond, *Red Tory* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010)
- ²¹ For a novel discussion of Thatcherism and the triumph of the middle classes see the work of Peregrine Worsthorne, notably his book *In Defence of Aristocracy* (London: HarperCollins, 2004)
- ²² Blond, 'Rise of the Red Tories'
- ²³ This reflects a wider interest in recent Conservative Party politics about cooperatives. See in particular the work of the Conservative Cooperative Movement.
- ²⁴ For more on this see my article, 'Conservatism and the poor: Conservative Party attitudes to poverty and inequality since the 1970s' *British Politics* (2009) vol. 4, no. 3, pp.341-62
- ²⁵ F. A. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol.2 The Mirage of Social Justice* (London: Routledge, 1976) and M. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975)
- ²⁶ See Garnett and Hickson, *Conservative Thinkers* for a discussion of this point.
- ²⁷ See R. M. Page, 'David Cameron's Modern Conservative approach to poverty and social justice: towards one nation or two?' and C. Pickles, 'Repairing the broken society: the way forward' both in *The Journal of Poverty and Social Justice* (2010) vol. 18, no. 2
- ²⁸ Centre for Social Justice, *Breakdown Britain* (London: Centre for Social Justice, 2006) and Centre for Social Justice, *Breakthrough Britain: Ending the Costs of Social Breakdown* (London: Centre for Social Justice, 2007)
- ²⁹ For a recent discussion of this see K. Hickson, 'Thatcherism, poverty and social justice' in *The Journal of Poverty and Social Justice* (2010) vol. 18, no. 2
- ³⁰ P. Marshall and D. Laws (eds.) *The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism* (London: Profile, 2004)
- ³¹ D. Brack, R.S. Grayson and D. Howarth (eds.) *Reinventing the State: Social Liberalism for the 21st Century* (London: Politicos, 2007)
- ³² J. Astle, D. Laws, P. Marshall and A. Murray (eds.) *Britain after Blair: A Liberal Agenda* (London: Profile, 2006)

³³ For more discussion of the recent ideological and electoral dilemmas of the Liberal Democrats see K. Hickson (ed.) *The Political Thought of the Liberals and Liberal Democrats since 1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009)

³⁴ Streeter (ed.) *There is Such a Thing as Society*

³⁵ The two poles identified by W. H. Greenleaf in his *The British Political Tradition, vol. 2, The Ideological Heritage* (London: Routledge, 1983)

³⁶ O. Letwin, 'Bring on the scrutiny' *The Guardian*, 3rd June, 2008

³⁷ D. Seawright, *The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics* (London: Continuum, 2009)

³⁸ See, for example, the discussion of what it means to be a One Nation Conservative by Damian Green in K. Hickson (ed.) *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005)

³⁹ A. Maude, *The Common Problem* (London: Constable, 1969)

⁴⁰ J. Bulpitt, 'The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher's Domestic Statecraft, *Political Studies* (1986) vol. 34